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ABSTRACT 
 
Using Bergson’s theory of history and Foucault’s concept of knowledge as power, among 
others, the paper argues that the field of Humanities in Africa should be reconceptualised into 
African Humanities in order to effect what Deleuze and Guattari have defined as conceptual 
self-semiotisation. The discipline must undertake, as in the past, a continual critique of the 
concept of the human subject, but without dethroning it as proposed by some Post-
structuralists. It must focus on how globalisation, science and technology impinge on the 
formation of subjectivity in Africa, including Malawi. Moreover, it must enact a strategic 
epistemological self-determination by appropriating, adapting and reconstituting received 
dominant theories and practices, which entails being both counter-hegemonic and consciously, 
but selectively, part of the dominant formation. It offers other strategies for implementing that 
shift, such as the deployment of the historical traditions of epistemological resistance as well as 
cultural and political decolonisation, as those advanced by Achebe, Ngugi, Soyinka, 
Chimombo, Oruka and Wiredu, among others. 
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And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time (Eliot, 1944, p. 30). 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The quotation above from Eliot suggests that our quest for knowledge leads us to where we started from, 
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as places and things we had known before reveal new truths, giving us a heightened cognition of our original 
points of departure as well as what is possible. It is a view influenced by Bergson’s notion of duration, 
which regards the past and the future as part of the same duration of temporality in what he terms the 
principle of succession with simultaneity (Bergson, 1971). Unlike in the familiar developmental 
progressivist view of history embodied, for instance, in Hegel’s philosophy (Hegel, 1807), in Bergson’s 
the future is not something ahead of us in some distant and far removed temporal space, but it is already 
with us and may have been with us for a long time.  It is this view of temporality and human agency 
that underpins my present reflections on what should be an agenda for the future theory and 
practice of Humanities in Africa. In what follows I argue that the future of Humanities in 
Africa is here and has been. We only require to abstract what is to become from what is 
and has been. We need to ask ourselves what we can learn from the past and present 
formation of Humanities in Africa to see what we can fashion into an agenda for action 
for the future. 
 
My view is that the Humanities in Africa must continue to map out the specific ways 
in which the local and the global simultaneously determine the human subject in Africa. 
Taking a leaf out of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s book (2004), in rethinking Humanities in Africa, 
we must semiotise or signify ourselves in order not only to apprehend fully our specific 
existential location, but also to ensure that our epistemological practice actively de-
universalises, decolonises and dethrones the dominant ideas in global Humanities. 
Even so, as Humanities scholars in Africa, we should continue with the main historical 
concern of Humanities, that is, to inquire into the changing nature of the human, but 
doing so by finding out how the human in our continent and in Malawi is shaped by his 
or her contingent location. 
 
In short, we must seek to grasp how the local and the global transform our subjectivities 
and their contexts, and how that in turn impinges on the Humanities as the site of a 
particular production of knowledge. That should result in an academic cultural practice 
that is true, if not always to all, at least to some of the progressive principles of its 
foundation, whilst remaining innovative. Such a practice will be necessarily 
transformative, since  it will be concerned with illuminating how in this particular corner 
of the globe, the human is manifested, produced and moving into the future. So, it will 
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be by capturing the being in movement of the human in Africa and, especially, Malawi 
that we will be contributing towards understanding the global formation of being human. 
By emphasising the idea of the human as production, we are keeping faith with the 
founding principles of our discipline in the nineteenth century as well as their radical 
reinterpretation in the Post-Marxist and Post-structuralist critical formation in the 
twentieth century. We must also continue to subject all our founding ideas, even their most 
persuasive revisions and epistemic breaks, under constant review, so they are reanimated or 
replaced altogether by more adequate readings. My contention is that an effective and 
visionary agenda for the future of Humanities in Malawi and Africa must be both 
foundational and critical. 
 
THE IDENTITY OF HUMANITIES IN AFRICA 
 
I have so far been speaking as if the idea of African Humanities is a settled matter. Are we 
here talking about the future of African Humanities in Africa or the future of Humanities 
in Africa? Our response to this important question has implications for how we conceive 
the future of the discipline in Africa. I think we are talking about both, but for analytical 
purposes we need to keep them separate. Clarification of the character of each element may 
help us work out how to combine them in order to achieve particular objectives in 
future. I will start by foregrounding the global character of the discipline and close with its  
local or indigenous dimension. Thus, we can say firmly that we are talking about the 
Humanities in Africa, as a product of the global history of the formation of the discipline. In 
this regard, Humanities in Africa, like Humanities internationally, employ similar concepts, 
teaching and research methods and, thus, the field is located similarly, as a site of learning 
and research, within the African academy as elsewhere. Of course, there will be minor 
differences of articulation and practice here and there, but , by and large, Humanities in 
Africa are part of an international academic and intellectual formation. 
 
Humanities in Africa are global in terms of the cultural production of academic 
authority. The formation of our identity as scholars is very much determined by our 
relationship to the international Humanities community. To use Fish’s concept (1980), 
we belong to an international interpretative community. Of course, the community is 
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differentiated in terms of our particular sub-disciplines or critical persuasions. 
Nevertheless, belonging to an international interpretive community means employing 
what Foucault (1972) has defined as a discursive formation, a set of regulations, statements 
and values as to what constitutes legitimate knowledge. That necessarily entails 
selecting certain issues, ideas and texts as the defining elements of the field. The 
community and its discourses constitute a regime of truth which not only regulates the 
discipline, but also forms a point of coalescence of heterogeneous power relations in society 
(Foucault, 1980, p.130). In other words, sites of knowledge, such as Humanities are about 
authority, power and the social production of truth. 
 
In order for one to belong to such a community, one has to be socialised through training, 
which for us here in Africa, involves predominantly being inducted into the arcane arts of 
the Humanities in the West or, in recent years, South Africa. A certificate from these 
institutions endows one with the authority to claim possession of the capacity to deploy masterly 
the official discursive regime. So, when we say Humanities in Africa are part of a global 
intellectual formation, we are really saying that the discipline and its practitioners are 
embedded within the global network of Humanities scholarship and pedagogy. They are 
located in Africa, but they are also situated in a global nexus of formation. That location 
is also subject to relations of power, most of which have to do with the history of 
colonialism and Neo-colonialism. In this respect, the African scholars rely for their 
professional credibility on conforming to the international disciplinary standards. Of 
course, there is no reason why one cannot opt out of this formation, but the price for 
doing so would be academic marginalisation. 
 
We are part of the global Humanities formation not only for reasons of knowledge 
production, regulation and dissemination, but equally because of a shared past of 
disciplinary formation. The presence of Humanities in Africa today is a result of a 
particular history —that of colonial acculturation into Western values, languages and modes 
of thought. The idea of Humanities, as both a conceptual category and institutional 
practice in Africa, arises out of the formation of Humanities in nineteenth-century Europe, 
as the founders of the discipline sought a return to both Classical learning and 
Renaissance Humanism (Davies, 2008, pp. 3-4). They revived the human-centred focus 
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that had been elaborated by Renaissance scholars, such as Erasmus through their concept 
of Humanism. Humanism was a celebration of the human perspective on the world as 
opposed to the traditional ones which regarded the human subject as an extension of 
an external order, either divine or natural. 
 
THE HUMANITIES-SCIENCE DIVIDE: PRESENT, PAST AND FUTURE 
 
The issues raised during the formation of the discipline still reverberate today, for instance the 
relationship between Humanities and Science. For the Renaissance scholars, Humanism included 
both, but, for the nineteenth century, even whilst promoting the idea of Renaissance man, the study of 
the human was perceived as separate from that of the laws of nature, Science. This problem was most 
visibly manifested in the Post-war debate inaugurated by Snow (1959), in which he argued that 
Humanities and Sciences had become polar opposites to the detriment of Humanities and that, whilst Science 
students had some reasonable knowledge of Humanities, Humanities ones were ignorant of the most basic 
concepts of Science and thus needed to be encouraged to learn some Science. Additionally, he argued that, 
since Science had mostly been responsible for the Allied victory during the Second World War, it should be 
allocated more resources.  
 
Snow’s characterization of Humanities as a waste of resources is familiar in discussions of the crisis of 
funding Humanities today internationally. The two fields are predominantly seen as mutually exclusive, 
serving as the climax of the process of separation began in the nineteenth century. Moreover, the 
debate is couched in terms that would not be unfamiliar to that period’s dominant philosophy, 
utilitarianism. The comparison between the disciplines in terms of magnitude of social impact, is 
reminiscent of the views of utilitarians, such as Bentham (1789). It is fundamentally about the 
use-value of knowledge. The perception that Humanities have a lesser value than Sciences has led to 
reduced Government funding towards the subject area in some countries. That has certainly been 
the case in Britain in recent years; and looking over the reports of National Humanities Councils in a 
few countries in the West, the fear of reductions in funding to Humanities is a constant worry. 
 
In his novel, Hard Times (1854), published at the height of utilitarianism, Dickens satirises the 
philosophy, especially, its emphasis on the scientific measure of utility, represented, for instance, by 
Bentham’s happiness algorithm. Through the aptlynamed character, Grandgrid, a school teacher 
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opposed to anything that cannot be measured mathematically, the novelist underscores the danger of 
the obsession with scientific purity and concern with keeping apart the Humanities and Sciences. 
Thomas Gradgrind is said to have been suspicious of human emotions, such as love and sadness, as 
they were incalculable. One wonders if old Gradgrind is not alive and well today! If he is, our 
job is to make sure that he is kept well away from education policy-making. Nevertheless, the 
perception that Humanities are irrelevant to national development goals will continue to be a major 
challenge for the discipline for the foreseeable future. We may need to fall back on the more 
progressive utilitarianism of Stuart Mill (1863) who, in opposition to Bentham and his father, 
argued that the worth of human action and knowledge needed to be based on qualitative rather than 
quantitative value. Our task here may be to reframe developmental objectives in terms of  not only 
the material needs of the human subject, but also the psycho-social and aesthetic ones as well. For 
our own survival as a society, it is important that we do not reduce the measure of knowledge 
solely to use-value, for no society can thrive only on the products of Science and technology 
alone. Think of Britain without Shakespeare or its museums! 
 
However, it will also be necessary for Humanities to respond imaginatively to the scientific and 
technological challenges that will necessarily intensify in the coming years. The next fifty years 
will witness unthinkable discoveries as well as technological inventions. Instead of clinging to the 
traditional boundaries of our disciplines which, understandably need defending at times, we must 
also seize the opportunity to explore how new scientific discoveries are transforming the idea of 
what it means to be human. There was recently a news story of how a man who had had severe 
injuries to his face received the face of a dead man (Gann, 2015). This surely is an exampleof 
wherenew scientific ideas are changing the very notion of the Human subject. Traditionally, the 
face is considered the central aspect of an individual’s identity, but the example cited problematises such a 
concept. The question is then: if the face is no longer the key to one’s identity, what is? That is territory we 
should be researching. Notions such as that of the cyborg are attempts to think of the ways in which we can 
no longer separate technological extensions to the human body from the body itself in conceptualising 
human subjectivity (Figueroa-Sarriera, Mentor, Gray, 1995). In terms of the curriculum, it might be worth 
considering, where possible, introducing programmes of study which intersect Humanities and Sciences, 
for instance, Medical Humanities, and Digital Humanities. We could also develop courses on the history 
of ideas that fuse the two disciplines, for example, on the History and Philosophy of Science and 
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Technology. Such courses should be made available to students from both fields. 
 
Another enduring problem the Humanities have inherited from its past and which we needs to  be re-
examined in constructing a viable future discipline is the practice of essentialising the human subject.  
Nineteenth-century Humanism and its particular articulation as Humanities was indeed a profound 
withdrawal from the earlier practices of defining the human subject. However, this radical idea became a 
constraining orthodoxy, as being human began to refer to an innate core, an essence which, for Descartes 
and others, was the mind seen as the seat of reason. His cogito: “I think, therefore I am,” is 
paradigmatic of the fundamental shift from a divine or external-centred view of knowledge to a human-
centred one. His depiction of the core of being as the rational self rather than the received idea of the 
soul would have a tremendous impact on knowledge and political life in subsequent centuries. Paine 
who was intimately involved in both the French and the American revolutions, but whose attempt to inspire a 
similar revolution in Britain was unsuccessful, was also at the forefront of the new Humanism. In his book, 
Paine (1791) advocated the “inalienable rights of man.” In the same period, Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
proclaimed “man is born free, but he is everywhere in Chains” (Rousseau, 1762, p. 1.)  
 
However, this radical reading of the human subject was partial and exclusive. As Mary Wollstonecraft 
(1792) pointed out, this heady celebration of “the rights of Man,” was indeed, just that--the privileging of 
the rights of men over those of women. She specifically criticised the way rationality was seen as a male 
preserve. Equally, Equiano (1789), a former slave who had bought himself out of slavery, contended that 
the practice of slavery illustrated the racialization of the dominant idea of the human. This criticism alerts us 
to the ways in which the emergence of the human as a subject of modern knowledge was complicit with 
existing power relations, foregrounding how even conceptual categories that are proposed to counter 
limiting ones can also produce other forms of exclusions. In developing an agenda for the future of 
Humanities in Africa, we need to ensure that our notions of the Human subject are always probed for 
possible areas of exclusion. Recently, there has been a lot of debate in Malawi and Africa generally about 
homosexuality.  Clearly, this is a topic that Humanities in Malawi and Africa should engage with, 
exploring the conditions under which certain forms of sexualities are excluded from dominant 
subjectivities. 
 
HUMANISM AS THE RETURN OF THE REPRESSED 
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It is clear that as the discovery of the Human subject in the Renaissance period and its rediscovery and 
further development in the nineteenth century opened up a new intellectual and imaginative territory, just as 
it is evident that such advances were also undermined by the residual ideology - it unwittingly served as a 
site for the reconstitution of the discarded religious concepts of self-hood. Thus, the privileging of 
rationality over religious being had not completely overhauled the latter, but only displaced it onto the 
former.  Rationality and “rational man” became the new object of worship. Thus, Humanism was a secular 
religion, a fact that is openly admitted by the various Humanist organisations of the time (Davies, 1997, p. 
28). Paine and Comte sought to set up institutions for the worship of the Human. Comte’s proposal included 
rituals and priests that were similar to those of the Church. Thus, Humanism, seemed to transfer the 
powers that had hitherto been arrogated to God to the entity of the human, but without changing the 
fundamental conception of being as essence. 
 
Although criticised by some radical nineteenth-century thinkers such as Nietzsche and Marx, this 
essentialism was to form the dominant paradigm for the Humanities until the rise of Post-Structuralism and 
Post-Marxism from the middle of the late twentieth century. In literary criticism, it was embodied in the 
assumption that any literary text transparently conveys a universal truth about human nature, an approach 
that was advanced and promoted by Leavis (1960). It dominated the study of literature in English 
Departments throughout the world for the most part of the twentieth century, including Chancellor 
College, University of Malawi.  Its application of the universalising tendency to African literature did not go 
unchallenged. Achebe rebuked an African exponent of the method, saying “[he] is proposing that […] I 
renounce my vision which […] is necessarily local and particular. […] He has simply and uncritically 
accepted the prevailing norms of colonialist criticism” (Achebe, 1973, pp. 52-53). In the Department of 
Human Behaviour, Anthropological textbooks were still premised on the idea of an essential subject, in 
terms of which traditional African societies were referred to as “primitive societies.” Evidently, Humanities 
in Africa, as part of a global academic formation, were employing concepts of the human subject that were 
actively diminishing the humanity of Africans, without the power or authority to challenge such concepts, 
since they constituted the dominant  legitimating discursive formation (Foucault, 1972). 
 
THE CRITIQUE OF THE ESSENTIALIST SUBJECT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
FUTURE OF HUMANITIES 
 
It is significant that whilst the essentialist subject was still part of the dominant thinking in Humanities in 
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Africa, internationally there were beginning to emerge serious doubts about the sustainability of such an 
approach. It was the rise of Post-Structuralism and Post-Marxism in the 1970s and 1980s that challenged it 
significantly. That was mostly advanced through the development of Post-colonial theory and Cultural 
Studies, disciplines which had translated the Post-Structuralist and Post-Marxist cultural theory to the 
concerns of Post-colonial societies. Among others, Foucault’s notion of the subject and that of discourse 
played and still play an important part in Humanities today, not only in Africa and the Post-colonial 
world, but internationally as well.  
 
Taking his concept of the subject first, Foucault founded it on the insights of the criticism of “universal 
Man” proposed by Nietzsche.  Nietzsche argued against the idea that there was some timeless essence that 
defined being Human. It is impossible to maintain that view in the context, for example, of the theory of 
evolution which posits “Man” or being Human as one, among a spectrum of human-like forms. Recasting 
that view, Foucault advises “Where the soul pretends unification or the self fabricates a coherent identity,” 
one “sets out to study the beginning—the numberless beginnings whose faint traces and hints of colour are 
rarely seen by an historical eye” (Foucault, 1977, p. 143). A number of Post-colonial critics, including those 
from Africa and of African origin have appropriated Foucault’s notion of the subject, notably Mbembe 
(2001), for the analysis of African social formations. Mbembe particularly demonstrates how the idea of 
the detotalised and decentred subject proposed by Foucault can illuminate the relationship between rulers 
and the ruled in contemporary Africa. This is the kind of project that should be developed further in African 
Humanities. As part of our contribution to understanding multiple local and global locations of the human 
subject today, we need to be asking about how African subjects are dispersed in heterogeneous discourses 
of formed society. In Malawi, for instance, one potentially productive area is the study of the ways in which 
subjectivity is distributed across the macro-politics of the national and the micro-ones , for example, of  
ethnicity and  regionalism. 
 
A related question would entail examining how such subject-formations are imagined or projected in 
everyday practice, cultural and linguistic representations. This is very much the terrain of Foucault’s notion 
of discourse which has done a lot to advance our understanding of social formations in Humanities today. 
Foucault uses the concept to describe how language and representations are linked to the question of power 
and knowledge. He reminds us of how disciplinary formations are not objective descriptions of knowledge, 
but are related to social and political hierarchies seemingly far removed from them.  His concept can be 
seen in Said (1978) and Mudimbe (1990).  I will return to this point in the next section; for now, however, 
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suffice to say it will be our ability to attend to how institutional processes of knowledge production relate to 
the production of subjectivity and discourses in the wider society that will ensure that Humanities in Africa 
remain both innovative and productive in the twenty-first century. 
 
Foucault’s contemporary, Althusser, has equally made an important intervention in the ways in which 
the human subject is viewed in Humanities today. Like the former, he expounds the idea that the human 
subject is socially produced, but, unlike the former, he believes that the notion of production needs to be 
located, albeit in a revised form, in the Marxist materialist tradition. Marx made one of the major 
interventions in the nineteenth-century, advocating a move away from the traditional Humanist idea of 
the human subject. In his de-essentialisation of the human subject, he argued that it be regarded as a 
product of the structural socio-economic relations particular to a mode of production, saying “It is not 
the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines 
their consciousness” (Marx, 1859, p. 4). So, whilst Nietzsche bequeathed to us the discursive-
deconstructive mode of critique rearticulated by Foucault, Marx offered the conception of the human as 
formed by the political economy. It is that notion that Althusser develops into his concept of the 
human subject.  He regards the subject as produced through what he terms the process of ideological 
interpellation. He argues that we are born as individuals, but are transformed into subjects of a 
particular ideological formation by being embedded and reconstructed in terms of the values of a given 
society through ideological state apparatuses, such as religion and education (Althusser, 1970). 
 
Althusser outlines an important research project for us, that is, to try and understand the ways in which 
human subjects are produced by the particular processes of ideological interpellation in Africa. As our 
society enters the next phase of significant industrial production through mineral extraction and even oil 
extraction, which will transform our social relations, our mores and indeed our environment, both 
natural and built, Humanities should play an important role in mapping out how the human is being 
affected by all the new forces at work in the country. It will be in that way that we will be undertaking 
epistemological agency, for as Marx observed “philosophers have only interpreted the world, […] the 
point is to change it” (Marx, 1845, p. 15). The question for us then becomes, “how do we as 
Humanities scholars change the world and how do we develop capacities and strategies to do so 
effectively?”  
 
Important as Marxism has been, it has itself been subject to criticism from both within and without. Some 
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of the weaknesses highlighted can form an important platform for rethinking Humanities in Africa. From 
within, it has been criticised, for instance, by Cultural Studies and Cultural Materialism (Hall, 1996, 
pp. 25-46) for privileging the infrastructure over ideology. Even more relevant to us here today is the 
World-systems theory advanced principally by Wallerstein (1974), which argues that, since the 15
th
 
century, starting with the so-called voyages of exploration, the whole world has been formed into a 
single system of economic production and relations of production. The theory is an attempt to move 
beyond classical Marxism, whilst accounting for the complex relations between Third-World and First-World 
countries in the formation of Capitalism. Furthermore, it investigates the ways in which the World-system 
produces a certain universalism of consciousness. It offers a framework for Humanities in Africa to reflect on 
how the contemporary global system interpellates Africans into subjects of global Capitalism. We could, in 
this respect, raise questions, for example, about the effects of the neo-liberal policies sponsored by the IMF 
and the World Bank on the conception and practices of human subjectivity in Africa today. 
 
We can thus summarise the general orientation of Humanities as a tension between these two modes of 
reading, between, on the one hand, a tendency to see certain human subjects and cultural and artistic 
practices as purveyors of enduring essential meanings, on the other, the idea that the human subject and its 
cultural and social products are a function of ideological, discursive or economic production. I would thus 
propose that in reconstituting Humanities in Africa for the future, we need to employ judiciously both 
sides. Undoubtedly, the constructivist approaches have done a lot to demonstrate how under the 
banner of the Human as universal and undifferentiated, many atrocities have been meted out against 
other human beings deemed less so. There is also a profound contradiction in the fact that some of the 
radical ideas on the human subject, such as Nietzsche’s, were employed to enforce violent racial 
stratification, for example, in the Jewish Holocaust in Germany. For Adorno and Horkheimer (1944), the 
Holocaust showed reason as inherently barbaric. What they suggest is that as Humanities scholars we must 
not assume the pursuit of rationality as an end in itself. Ethics should mediate the pursuit of 
rationality. Additionally, we need to take into account the relationship between affect or emotion and 
subjectivity, probing how affect is implicated in the formation of contemporary subjectivity in Africa.  
 
It is perhaps in terms of affect that I struggle against the radical rejections of the concept of the human 
subject proposed by some Post-structuralists, memorably captured in Barthes’s phrase, “The Author is 
Dead” (1967). The proposal to do away with the subject could be seen as illustrating the form of 
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rationality that Adorno and Horkheimer warn against. Indeed, Spivak has accused such theorists of secretly 
reinstalling the human subject not as a universal subject, but as a Western sovereign subject (Spivak, 
1988, pp. 271-274). It is also the case that the proposed absolute deterritorialisation of the Subject can 
only be advanced in a context  where the human subject is a secure category, but it is difficult to do so where 
historically people have been denied any claim to full subjectivity, such as in Africa. In reformulating the 
future of Humanities in Africa, we need not dislodge the human subject from our purview, but make it the 
centre of the discipline.  
 
Even so, we also need to study the relationship between virtual lives and real lives. Information 
technology offers tremendous opportunities for Humanities research. A vast number of people in the 
world and in Malawi spend a lot of time on the mobile phone and the Internet. It is not unusual 
nowadays to see people seating together, but each one of them busy on the phone or the Internet, 
communicating with someone else — that is a new way of sharing space. We should be asking: what 
are the ontological issues arising out of the relationship between the virtual and real space as well as from 
the constant simultaneous inhabitation of the virtual and real? Here, it is the question of double-
subjectivity and double-locations that is worth exploring. Postmodernist theorists such as Baudrillard 
(1991) have been asking profound questions about the relationship between the real and the virtual after 
the intervention of television and other computing technologies in day-today practice. Reality 
Television programmes such as Big Brother call into question the distinction between the televisual-real 
and lived-real, since what we watch in these programmes are real people performing themselves and even 
reinventing themselves for the sake of making a good television programme. There is also the even 
more interesting question: to what extent do we have a reality outside televisual and virtual 
representation? However, again, we need to be sure that in the interrogation of the relationship between 
the real and the virtual, we work, with what Levinas calls an ontological distance from the Other and ensure 
that we do not aestheticise the space of the Other in the way in which Baudrillard does in the claim that 
“The Gulf War did not take place,” (Levinas, 1961, p. 26); Baudrillard, 1991). 
 
Evidently, Humanities in Africa will be contending with similar issues to those on the international 
agenda. That will require keeping up with developments in international critical and cultural theory in 
order to access new scholarship that could contribute to research into the local manifestations of global 
issues. There will be need to train African scholars internationally, even when African Universities will 
 
13 
 
have achieved self-sufficiency in training research students. Travel and short-term attachments to other 
institutions in Africa and abroad will be vital in ensuring that African Humanities scholars effectively 
participate in debates and discussions of the most current ideas in the field. That will require sufficient 
resourcing as well as effective research development strategies. Furthermore, governments and 
Universities will need to consider seriously the formation of national or regional Humanities Academies, 
similar to the British Academy. Over and above the Universities, the British Academy promotes advanced 
Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences by raising funds from government and other organisations 
to fund research. The British academy is for the Humanities what the Royal Academy is for Sciences. The two 
institutions also confer the highest honours to academics in the form of Fellowships which have an 
additional status to the Professorship. As the number of Universities is likely to increase in Malawi 
and Africa generally, an institutional level that consolidates, advances and promotes Humanities research 
over and above the efforts of individual Universities is required. 
 
TOWARDS AFRICAN HUMANITIES 
 
As indicated at the beginning of the paper, there is a sense in which Humanities in Africa are part of the 
historical formation of Humanities globally. In this respect, international Humanities will be an 
important basis for rethinking the future of Humanities in Africa. Nevertheless, Humanities in 
Africa are also a particular formation--they are not merely an extension of global Humanities. Thus, 
we can describe the discipline as a hybrid knowledge practice. As a function of their geographical 
and cultural context, Humanities in Africa have historically had to adapt international knowledge to 
local conditions. Therefore, in refashioning the discipline, we need to build on such indigenising 
effort, making it more African in its theory as well as methods, of course, without cutting off 
completely from our international historical heritage. That entails shifting from Humanities in Africa 
to African Humanities. 
 
The concept of African Humanities necessarily implies a discipline that is particular, a subset of a general 
global Humanities. African Humanities is about the identity of the academic practice of Humanities on 
the continent, whether it is an African practice in the way in which traditional African medicine is. It 
implies that it is an academic practice belonging to and practiced by a group of scholars geographically or 
culturally located in Africa, but with the possibility of looking at the human in general. In this context, the 
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agenda for the future entails greater ownership of the discipline in the way in which its theories and methods 
are produced and disseminated, of the ways in which we teach and what we teach. It requires greater 
autonomy of thought, method, research and pedagogical practice. The question then is: “how do we 
develop a capacity for working with Western theories, whilst engendering epistemological and pedagogical 
agency as well as autonomy?” In order to shift the balance towards the local production of 
knowledge in African Humanities, there is need to deconstruct received and dominant theories 
and methodologies in the field. We must also adapt them to our local circumstances and, 
having done so, reconstitute them as forms of local self-apprehension and expression (Soyinka, 
1976, viii-ix). To begin with, an effective African Humanities must be a continuation of the 
legacy of self-determination which informed the founding and the function of Post-colonial 
Higher education in the years following independence. 
 
It is well known that Humanities students and scholars had been at the forefront of 
decolonisation in Africa. Achebe’s Things Fall Apart (1958) was an important assertion of cultural 
decolonisation, an attempt to revalorise the colonial representation of African culture as “primitive.” 
Senghor, the first President of Senegal, was a leading member of the Negritude movement which asserted 
the value of indigenous culture against colonial cultural denigration (Irele, 2011). Here in Malawi, 
writers such as Rubadiri and Chiume, additionally took an active role in the formal resistance of the 
colonial regime. Indeed, the University of Malawi was founded as a part of the desire to reduce 
dependency on other countries with regard to education. It was an early expression of political 
autonomy. I have been told, but it has not yet been independently verified, that some of the seed 
money for starting the University of Malawi, included funds collected by Malawian students studying at 
the University of Makerere, including the Bwanausi brothers. Whether this story is true or not, there 
was certainly the desire by the Malawian nationalists to provide opportunities for young Malawians to 
study at home, instead of having to rely on the few places available at the University of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland and elsewhere. The Humanities were at the centre of the curriculum of the University as part 
of the established British education system, but also for the particular reason that Malawi needed a 
number of trained senior civil servants to fill in the gaps created by the departing colonial officials and also 
for the extension of the civil service’s reach within the territory. The University’s Humanities programme 
was vital to the enhancement of the human resource capacity of Post-colonial Malawi, for example, in its 
training of teachers and teacher-trainers. Thus, Humanities were not only central to decolonisation, but also 
to the production of the much-needed Post-colonial manpower. 
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It is to the extent that the Humanities came to us as a practice that was connected to colonial 
domination that specifying an African Humanities does involve a continuation of the process of 
decolonisation. It is in this regard that historically there has been a number of efforts at the critique of 
received knowledge. We can legitimately consider them as having laid the foundation for an African 
Humanities. These have mostly focussed on decolonising African epistemology. One of the best 
examples is Ngugi’s and his colleagues’ 1968 famous proposal for the abolition of the Department of 
English at the University of Nairobi and its replacement with a Department of Literature and a 
corresponding Department of Languages (Ngugi, 1972). The group challenged the connection between 
the way disciplines are defined and located within the African academy. They contended that the  
manner in which disciplines are organised in an institution is not innocent, but an expression of a particular 
ideology. The presence of an English Department in an African University where there was no Department 
of African Languages perpetuated cultural colonialism by implying that English was inherently a more 
worthy language of academic study than African languages. The lesson from this critique is that in 
rethinking the future of Humanities, we need to reflect on how Humanities are located in relation to other 
disciplines within the University in order to illuminate underlying power relations.  We need to ask: “are 
there legacies of hierarchies within the structure and knowledge map of the University which need 
changing?” 
 
Ngugi and his colleagues also argued that the ways in which the syllabus was organised had not taken into 
account the Post-colonial African context of the University.  In terms of its cartography of knowledge, the 
University was constitutively outside the Post-colonial formation, as if independence had not taken place.  
Except in name, it was a foreign institution located in Africa, in the way in which the American University in 
Cairo is. Thus, the University of Nairobi was an ideological apparatus for interpellating the Kenyan students as 
Universal Subjects, without regard to their cultural specificity. What Ngugi and his colleagues had pointed out 
was not simply a matter of debate--it was a historical fact, but, one that had been forgotten in the transition from 
colonial rule to independence. The University of Nairobi, as an off-shoot of Makerere University,  which itself 
had been a University of London college,  had patently not been founded on African nationalist principles, but 
rather British colonial interests. 
 
So Ngugi and his colleagues were performing a belated, but important review of how institutions derived from 
the West could be redesigned to fit in with the aims and goals of nationalist education. They proposed to 
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reverse that situation and ensure that the institution approached the students first and foremost as Post-colonial 
African subjects. To do that, they suggested that students start learning about their immediate environment. 
With regard to literature they demanded that students begin by studying their own literature and 
progressively moving through that of the African Diaspora, the Third-Word and then that of Eastern and 
Western Europe. The structure of pedagogical practice here is to begin with self-knowledge and then 
knowledge of the Other in a philosophy that promotes both autonomy and interdependence and does not 
deflate the self in deference to alterity. Ngugi extended this critique of what might be called Neo-
Colonial epistemologies to language, arguing that language is not a transparent tool for 
communication, but a bearer of particular values and, thus, the continued use of the English language 
in Africa and low investment in African languages meant that Post-colonial Africa was continuing 
with the colonial project of acculturation (Ngugi, 1986). In his call for the teaching and use of 
African languages within higher education and creative writing, he was advancing a distinctly African Post-
colonial epistemology through which a Post-colonial African human subject, as opposed to a colonial one, 
could be produced ideologically and discursively. Ngugi and others were asking fundamental 
questions about the interplay between ideology and the institutionalisation of knowledge. In 
essence, they were echoing Foucault’s call to attend to the relationship between knowledge and 
power referred to earlier. They provide an example of how one can draw on Western knowledge to ask 
new questions about a specifically African context. It is well known that Ngugi’s approach to cultural 
decolonisation was inspired by Marxism, among others, but his Marxism was not doctrinaire — it easily 
mixed matters of political economy with those of Nationalism as well as Leavisite criticism. 
 
The attempt to decolonise knowledge at the University of Nairobi had broader repercussions on the 
continent. The University of Malawi was caught up in that movement directly, as James Stewart, who 
had been the acting Head, thus, on the receiving end of Ngugi’s memorandum at the University of 
Nairobi, became the Head of the English Department at Chancellor College. We do not know why 
Stewart left Nairobi. Whatever misgivings he may have had about Ngugi’s ideas, in Malawi, he presided 
over an overhaul of the English syllabus. The new syllabus was both Western and African. So the 
students were taught Shakespeare, Achebe, Ngugi and Soyinka, among others. That was not a typical 
syllabus of an English Department in Britain or the USA. The example of Stewart’s leadership in 
indigenising the curriculum of an English Department demonstrates the importance of leadership in 
rethinking the status quo and implementing change. It would be disingenuous to ignore the racial identity of 
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the agent of change in a context where a few years before Stewart arrived, the question of White leadership 
had caused an irreparable schism among the Post-colonial leadership.  From an Afrocentric perspective, it 
could be read as a limited intervention that may have been motivated by the desire for professional self-
preservation. However, from a constructivist viewpoint, Stewart’s race was not as important as his ability to 
unlearn the old habits and, not only affiliate himself with the new, but become one of its principal advocates. 
The ideology he disengaged from was one that enveloped African academics as well, many of whom 
underwent their own form of self-decolonisation. Thus, as we reflect on the future of the field, we need to 
ensure that we consciously foster research and pedagogical leadership within Departments, separately or in 
conjunction with administrative leadership. 
 
The conscious development of research and pedagogical leaders within the institutions should also 
foreground the importance of knowledge reproduction within and beyond the institutions. In this context, I 
find Bourdieu’s and Paasseron’s (1970) idea of knowledge as cultural or symbolic capital extremely helpful. 
In their view, the knowledge we produce and disseminate gives us cultural capital, as it enables us access, 
define and reproduce social and political power. The English Department at the University of Malawi 
produced and reproduced cultural capital, not only thorough teaching and research, but also by public 
dissemination of knowledge. That was exemplified markedly by Adrian Roscoe, a former colleague of 
Stewart’s at the University of Nairobi, who joined the Department and published some seminal work on 
African and especially East African and Malawian writing whilst at the Chancellor College (Roscoe, 1977).  
He was, together with others in the Department, prominent in setting up the Malawi Writers Series. Equally 
important was the promotion of indigenous content in teaching and research by some Malawian 
academics: Felix Mnthali, Steve Chimombo and Jack Mapanje, Lupenga Mphande and Enoch 
Timpuza-Mvula were all involved in projects of cultural retrieval, especially of orature, and important 
journals, such as Outlook, Kalulu, Odi, and Umodzi were established to promote orature and indigenous 
writing. The Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) radio programmes such as Writers Corner, 
University Magazine, and Theatre of the Air became sites of exploration of local arts and concepts of 
representation. Such sites and the ideas they generated  were not only contributing to the establishment of a 
research paradigm in African Humanities, but they were also useful tools for transforming the teaching of 
the next generation of university and school teachers, translating the new knowledge into active 
pedagogical content and practice. 
 
Equally visible was the decolonising curricular and research effort of the History Department which was 
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famous for its engaging staff-student seminars. What stands out there is the value of team work and clear 
research and academic leadership. J.B Webster, as Professor of History in the mid-seventies, did a lot to 
consolidate the effort to construct a Malawian Historiography. It was quite evident that the Department 
was working in close intellectual proximity with other departments in the region and beyond, for instance, in 
Dar es Salaam where radical historians, such as Terrence Ranger and Walter Rodney, were challenging 
received historiographies. It was also, perhaps, the idea of research and teaching as being part of a cultural 
and political project that was at the centre of the efforts to transform teaching and Research in these 
Departments. Hall (1996) makes an important distinction between academic work and intellectual 
work, with the former described as essentially doing academic work as a job and the latter as a way of 
life. There was a palpable sense in the History Department of teaching, learning and research as a 
serious way of life. I think that is a practice worth emulating as we seek to transform the Humanities in 
the future. Such a view also invigorates teaching, as students become aware that they are not just being fed 
information, but they are involved in something broader than their class work, in a political project of 
national interest. It is important to share with our students how our approach to what we are teaching 
and researching feeds into broader national and international knowledge formation. 
 
In his seminal work, Kaufmann (1977) says the challenge to Humanities is the way in which students are 
taught. In his view, we must train students to think critically, rather than just give them information. With 
the easy availability of academic information on the internet, teaching is particularly challenged to do more 
than impart information. We need to embed critical thinking, in the full spectrum of our activities -- 
questioning and inquiring should be the basis of our teaching and research practice. That can be allied to 
the more political view of pedagogy provided by Frere (1970), in which teaching serves as a mode of 
conscientisation, of awakening students to their ideological location in the world and the potential of 
knowledge as a practice of intervention.  I hope we can see more of that in the future and that should help 
motivate students to continue engaging with their disciplines long after graduation. 
 
I am also intrigued by Kaufmann’s call for Humanities teachers to be visionaries. I would class the teachers I 
have mentioned here as among some of the visionary teachers the University of Malawi had. We need to 
emulate their examples and see how they can enrich our teaching and research in future. What I am 
suggesting is that we need to study the Ngugis, the Stewarts, the Mnthalis, Chimombos and others in 
preparing for an agenda for the future of African Humanities. I am also aware that I have so far been using 
a collaborative model of Humanities teaching and research. That is not how Humanities are perceived 
19 
 
usually: they are seen as involving a more individualist than the collaborative style typical of scientific 
research. However, in reality there is a lot of collaboration within Humanities, but we need to foreground it 
much more. That will also enhance the sense of an intellectual rather than just an academic community. 
The contributions I have been describing, especially in the History Department show the value 
of team work, of how senior members of staff enable junior members and students, making 
research not purely individualist or competitive, but an on-going collaborative practice. In the 
end, successful teaching and research is about spreading good practice across a team in a 
department, faculty or the university as a whole. 
 
The counter-hegemonic gesture has sometimes entailed the extension of Western 
conceptual categories to African contexts, demonstrating that exclusion of the 
African experience from main-stream disciplinary concerns had less to do with the desire to 
maintain the legitimating rules of knowledge than the exercise of colonial and Neo-
colonial ethnocentrism. There have been some memorable attempts in this regard, 
especially in Philosophy. One can recall the important contributions of the Ghanaian 
Philosopher Wiredu (1980) which sought to prove that Western philosophical 
categories could be applied to African philosophy, especially in the area of epistemology 
and ontology. Additionally, the work of the Kenyan scholar, Oruka (1990), was 
pioneering in promoting Sage-Philosophy as a basis for researching and conceptualising 
indigenous African philosophy, observing that most of Pre-Socratic Philosophers, like 
Thales, were ordinary and usually unschooled, but they reflected on philosophical issues 
deeply and doing so in the manner reminiscent of wise old people in Africa. He noted that 
Ancient Greek Philosophy was to a large extent based on the thinking of Sages. He set out 
to find such Sages in Kenya and to collect their philosophical wisdom and analyse it. He 
called this philosophy Sagacity. Oruka’s work and also the work on orature at the 
University of Malawi generally had an impact on the Chancellor College Philosophy 
Department. Kaphagawani’s and Chidammodzi’s research into indigenous Malawian 
philosophy was an example of such a line of inquiry. This effort is similar to that of 
theologians such as Mbiti (1969) who contested the view that traditional African society 
was irreligious and pagan. Mbiti recovered the concept of God, among others, within 
traditional African cosmology. It can also be seen in the application of various received 
critical approaches such as Marxism, Post-Structuralism and Leavisite and New Criticism 
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to African literature. This is a strategy that may come in handy in rethinking the future 
of the Humanities. 
 
Nevertheless, though the extension of Western concepts to an African context is an invaluable 
contestation of exclusion of African experience from Western theory, it is limited, as it merely 
applies such categories than confront their foundations. A more radical approach entails producing 
indigenous models, principally by using dominant categories and modes of legitimation to specify a 
different mode of cognition. In this case, appropriation moves into transformative adaptation and 
then reconstitution into a recognisably new form. Soyinka offers an excellent example of such a 
practice. In his essay “‘The Fourth Stage,” (Soyinka, 1976), he puts Nietzschean ideas on Greek 
Tragedy in a creative tension with Yoruba narratives of origin and constructs homologies between them which 
he reworks into his own cosmological framework, on the basis of which he constructs a new theoretical and 
aesthetic idiom that he deploys in his creative work. Using his framework, Soyinka is also able to reinterpret 
Greek Tragedy, for example, in The Strong Breed (1973) as primarily a conflict of existential choice between 
being-in-itself and being-for-the-Other. That is a different approach from the traditional reading of the genre as 
driven by determinism. He elaborates his theory in his rewriting of Euripides’ The Bacchae (1973).  The 
trajectory of Soyinka’s thought offers an exemplary pathway for semiotising ourselves. It is in essence a 
Phenomenological project in that he starts from his own experience and moment in history, accepting 
both his acculturation in European thought and socialisation into Yoruba cosmology, language and 
culture as his point of departure and then brings the two into a dynamic interplay that yields a third 
term that is neither one nor the other, but a veritably new conceptual formation and cultural practice. 
 
The Malawian writer, Steve Chimombo, mines the same vein as Soyinka in his recovery of the Napolo 
and Mbona narratives of origin, providing him with an elaborate framework for illuminating historical sites 
of political and cultural transition and their concomitant social crises. That is explored in his play the 
Rainmaker (1987) and Napolo Poems (1995).  He has formalised his aesthetic principles in his theory 
of Ulimbaso which he defines as “a dynamic theory of art creation and appreciation based on how the 
Chewaman articulates his own artistic vision” (Chimombo, 1988, p. vii). When I had earlier looked at 
Chimombo’s theory it looked slightly implausible, but on re-examining it, I am struck by its radical attempt 
to categorise Malawian arts in terms of a cultural concept from indigenous culture. Besides, having 
compared it with the concept of Napantla (in-between-ness) proposed by the American-Mexican theorist 
Anzaldua (1999), it is clear that it is part of a significant Third World attempt to resignify its  cultural 
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concepts. I have, thus, concluded that Chimombo theory is an important effort at Self-Semiotisation, 
constituting an example we can take forward in producing an African Humanities. The question 
remains, however, “why did Anzaldua’s similarly indigenous concept take off and Chimombo’s did not?” 
There are many possible reasons for that, I am sure, but one of them is the differential location of the 
two authors in the World-System of knowledge. Within the centre-periphery model that arguably still 
structures the circuit of international knowledge production, the capacity of Chimombo’s work to 
assemble value around itself is diminished by its location. Therefore, in developing an African 
Humanities, serious consideration should be given to how such knowledge will be plugged onto the 
international knowledge circuit. We may need to create docking points for such work along the 
circuit, so it can participate in the international current of ideas, relaying and modifying their flow. 
Collaboration will be important in this regard too. There is need for co-publishing arrangements 
with publishing houses in the West and, where resources allow, greater investment in promoting 
indigenously-produced work. 
 
The key to the success of Anzaldua’s concept, apart from her location in the USA, is that it emerged at a 
time when a suitable conceptual docking point was available on the international knowledge circuit. It 
arrived on the scene at the same time as Bhabha’s popular work which similarly proposes in-betweenness as 
an important critical concept (Bhabha, 1994), whereas there is no evidence of a similarly enabling 
contextual factor for Chimombo’s concept.  The challenge then is not only one of creating indigenous 
concepts, but also of ensuring that they are strategically encoded on existing conceptual categories on the 
circuit of the ruling discursive formation. The alternative would be to create an entirely new discursive 
formation, which must, of course remain the ultimate aim, but, as it requires not only the capacity to 
engender new terms, but also to control the material means of knowledge production and reproduction, 
for the time being, we must learn to plug our knowledge into enabling elements of the international circuit. 
As Foucault reminds us knowledge is intimately linked to formations of power both within the 
academy and outside. In this context, the ability to rethink the humanities entails, in the short term, the 
strategic occupation of the World-System of knowledge and, in the long run, the complete 
transformation of its power structure.  
 
Inventing entirely new concepts or discursive formations is not the only way we can engender and advance 
African Humanities. An African Humanities can be achieved by repatriating concepts from the 
international circuit of ideas that are based on African culture and employing them in the study of 
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African societies and cultures. We could also compare and contrast how their international usage relates 
to the original indigenous use or modern Post-colonial forms. I am thinking here of the term fetishism 
which is one of the key terms in Marxism as well and Psychoanalysis which originated in Africa (Pietz, 
1985, pp. 5-17).  Evidently, the concept has evolved through its entry in European culture and thought as 
well as colonial and Post-colonial Africa. In reformulating an African Humanities, we could ask: “how 
can the idea of the fetish help us interpret not only traditional African society, but our Post-colonial experience 
of modernity as well?” How can it help us explain the particular forms of commodification and 
materialism or, what we might translate as, chintumwalisation, in contemporary African societies, 
including Malawi? The proposed practice would contribute to an archaeology of African concepts in both 
the local and international archive and, moreover, would substantially undermine the myth that Africans 
have not contributed significantly to the development of international knowledge. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we should say looking at the history of Humanities in Africa and the current situation, the 
future looks bright, but it will be even more so if we move towards greater intellectual autonomy and 
specify more concretely a project of African Humanities. That is easier said than done. In order to 
embark on that journey we should learn from the history of the development of Humanities themselves. 
Humanities emerged from Humanism which was a form of counter-identification with the then dominant 
idea, of a theocentric order. It advocated a secular vision of the world, but it then itself became an occluding 
dogma as the idea of the human was circumscribed and essentialised. The de-essentialisation of the 
human subject was much needed, but it also went too far, to almost an anti-human level, at least some of it. It 
is now time to rehumanise the human subject, but not to develop another eternally privileged space, but to 
assert the ethical importance of being human, even as we must constantly submit our notion of the ethical 
to critical reflection. In conclusion, the lesson of history for now and the future is that we must carry out a 
dialectic of critique, affirmation and then critique. Perhaps, there might yet be renewed uses for Hegel’s 
dialectics, though his view of dialectics patently did not include Humanities in Africa or African 
Humanities (Hegel, 1837).
23 
 
WORKS CITED 
Achebe, C. (1958). Things Fall Apart. London: Heinemann. 
Achebe, C. (1975). Morning Yet on Creation Day. London: Heinemann. 
Adorno, T.W and Horkheimer, M. (1947, 1997). Dialectic of Enlightenment. London: Verso. 
Althusser, L. (1970, 1971). Lenin, Philosophy and Other Essays. Trans. Ben Brewster. London 
Left Review. 
Anzaldua, G.  (1999). Borderlands: San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books. 
Bhabha, H. (1994). The Location of Culture. London: Routledge. 
Barthes, R. (1967, 1993), Image, Music, Text. London: Fontana. 
Baudrillard, J. (1991, 1995). The Gulf War Did Not Take Place. Trans. Paul Patton. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Bentham, J. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. London: …1789. 
Bergson, H. (1889, 1971). Time and Free Will. Trans. F.L. Pogson. London: Allen and Unwin. 
Bourdieu, P., Passeron, J-C. (1970, 2000) Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture. 
London: Sage. 
Chimombo, S. (1987). Napolo Poems. Zomba: Manchichi Publishers. 
Chimombo. S. (1988). Malawian Oral Literature. Zomba: University of Malawi Centre for 
Social Research. 
Davies, T. (1997). Humanism. London: Routledge. 
Dickens, C. (1854, 2003).  Hard Times. London: Penguin. 
Deleuze, G., Guattari, F. (2004). A Thousand Plateaus. London: Continuum. 
Descartes, R.  (1996). Meditations on First Philosophy. Trans. J. Cottingham. Cambridge: 
Cambridge U. Press. 
24 
 
Equiano, O. (1789, 1996). The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano. London: 
Heinemann. 
Eliot, T.S. (1922). Four Quartets. London: Faber and Faber. 
Figueroa-Sarriera, H., Mentor, S., Gray, C. H. (1995). The Cyborg Handbook. London: 
Routledge,  
Fish, S. (1980). Is There A Text in This Class.? Harvard U. Press. 
Foucault, M. (1972). The Archaeology of Knowledge. Translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith. 
London: Tavistock Publications. 
Foucault, M. (1980). Power/Knowledge. Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press. 
Foucault, M. (1977). Language, Counter-Memory, Practice. New York: Cornell University. 
Freire, P. (1970, 1996). The Pedagogy of the Oppressed. London: Penguin. 
Gann, Carrie. (2015). http://abcnews.go.com/Health/doctors-perform-extensive-face-
transplant/story. Retrieved: 18 February, 2016. 
Hall, S. (1996) Marxism Without Guarantees, in D Morley, Chen, K-H (Ed.), Stuart Hall (pp. 
25-46). London: Routledge.  
Hegel, G.W.F.  (1807, 1976) Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. V. Miller.  Oxford: Oxford U. 
Press. 
Hegel. G.W.F. (1837, 2006). Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2006. 
Irele. F.A. (2011). Negritude Moment. New Jersey: Africa World Press. 
Kaufmann, W. (1977). The Future of Humanities. New York: Reader’s Digest Press. 
Kaphagawani, D.N. and Chidammodzi, H.F. (1983). Chewa Cultural Ideals and System of 
Thought as Determined from Proverbs. Pula 3 (3), 29-37. 
Leavis, F. R. (1960). The Great Tradition. London: Chatto & Windus. 
25 
 
Levinas, E. (1961, 1979). Totality and Infinity. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. Boston: M. Nijhoff 
Publishers. 
Marx, K. (1859, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Translated: S.W. 
Ryazanskaya. Moscow: Progress Publishers, Moscow. 
Marx, K. (1845, 1969). Theses on Feuerbach. Trans. W. Lough. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 
Moscow. 
Mbembe. A. (2001). On the Postcolony. London: U. of California Press. 
Mbiti. J. (1969). African Religions and Philosophy. London: Heinemann. 
Mill, J. S. (1863). Utilitarianism. London: London: Parker, Son & Bourn. 
Mudimbe, V.Y. (1990). The Invention of Africa. Oxford: James Currey. 
Nietzsche, F (1897, 1986) Human, all too Human. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: 
Cambridge U. Press. 
Ngugi, W.T. (1972). Homecoming. London: Heinemann. 
Ngugi, W.T. (1986). Decolonising the Mind. London: Heinemann. 
Oruka, H.O. (1990). Sage philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate on African 
Philosophy. Leiden: Brill. 
Paine, T. (1985). Rights of Man. London: Penguin. 
Pietz, W. (1985). The Problem of the Fetish, I. RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics. 9, 5-17. 
Rousseau, J-J. (1762, 2008). The Social Contract. Oxford: Oxford U. Press. 
Roscoe, A.A. (1977) Uhuru’s Fire. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press. 
Said, E. (1978). Orientalism. London: Penguin. 
Snow, C.P.  (1959). The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge U. 
Press. 
26 
 
Soyinka, W. (1973). The Strong Breed. In Collected Place. Oxford: Oxford U. Press. 
Soyinka, W. (1973). The Bacchae of Euripides. In Collected Place. Oxford: Oxford U. Press. 
Soyinka, W. (1976). Myth, Literature and the African World. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press. 
Spivak, G.C. (1988). Can the Subaltern Speak? In C. Nelson C. and L. Grossberg, L. (Ed.), 
Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (pp. 271-313). Urbana: U. of Illinois Press. 
Wiredu, K. (1980). Philosophy and African Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press.  
Wallerstein, I. (1974). The Modern World-System. London: Academic Press. 
Wollstonecraft, M. (1792, 2004) A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. London: Penguin. 
 
 
